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II. ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
A. The District Court Abused its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Hulse's 
Rule 35 Motion and Request for Leave. 
In his Opening Brief, Mr. Hulse set forth how the district court abused its discretion in 
denying his Rule 35 motion and request for leave because the manner by which the district court 
did so was not an exercise of sound reason. As Mr. Hulse explained, simply writing "Denied 
3/2/2011" on the face of Mr. Hulse's motion without any justification whatsoever created a 
record that lacks any evidence showing the district court recognized the decision before it as one 
left to its discretion or that the district court reached its conclusion by an exercise of reason. In 
response, the State argues the district court is not required to state on the record its reasons for 
denying a defendant's Rule 35 motion because it is the defendant's burden to create an adequate 
record for review. Respondent's Brief, p.3. The State also argues the district court did not 
unduly limit the information it would consider when it denied Mr. Hulse's request for leave to 
supplement his motion because he should have made an offer of proof showing what evidence he 
intended to provide. Respondent's Brief, p.3. 
It is undisputed and both parties agree that when a sentence is within its statutory limits a 
motion pursuant to Rule 35 for a reduction of the sentence is a plea for leniency and is reviewed 
on appeal for an abuse of discretion. State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 735, 170 P.3d 397,400 
(2007). Moreover, Mr. Hulse acknowledges that "[w]hen presenting a Rule 35 motion, the 
defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information 
subsequently provided to the district court in support of the Rule 35 motion." State v. Huffman, 
144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007). This however does not alleviate the district court 
from soundly exercising its reason when ruling upon such motions. The district court must still 
perceive the issue as one of discretion and act within the outer boundaries of such discretion and 
consistently with any applicable legal standards. State v. Izaguirre, l 45 Idaho 820, 165 P.3d 
273, 282 (2007). 
Here, the question is whether the district court's denial of Mr. Hulse's Rule 35 motion by 
just writing "denied" on the face of the motion was an exercise of sound discretion. In doing so 
the district court, not Mr. Hulse, created a situation where there is no record of the reasoning 
employed by the district court. The State nevertheless argues Mr. Hulse bears the burden of 
creating an adequate record on review. In support of its argument the State cites to State v. 
Mowrey, 128 Idaho 804,919 P.2d 333 (1996). 
In Mowrey, the defendant appealed the district court's denial of his motion to reduce his 
conviction of lewd conduct with a minor child under the age of sixteen from a felony to a 
misdemeanor under Idaho Code§ 19-2604. A1owrey, 128 Idaho at 805, 919 P.2d at 334. On 
appeal Mowrey argued that making relief available to some people convicted of other types of 
sex offenses against children under section 19-2604, while precluding him and others similarly 
situated, violated the equal protection clauses of both the federal and state constitutions. id. 
The Mowrey Court affirmed the district court's decision denying the defendant's motion. 
In doing so the Court of Appeals noted there was no indication in the record that Mowrey had 
challenged the constitutionality of section 19-2604 at the district court level. Id. Moreover, the 
record did not establish whether the district court denied Mowrey relief because of the express 
language in section 19-2604 prohibiting such relief or whether it disregarded the statute and 
denied the motion on the merits. Id. As a result the Afowrey Court stated it would not "speculate 
as to the reasons for the district court's decision" and reiterated that the appellant has the burden 
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of providing an adequate record on appeal. Id. 
What is unknown in Mowrey is whether the inadequate record on appeal was the result of 
the appellant's failure to provide the appellate court with a complete record or whether the 
inadequate record on appeal resulted from the district court's unilateral actions. To the extent 
that Mowrey supporis the proposition that criminal defendant's are always required to provide an 
adequate record on appeal regardless of the district court's actions, then lvfowrey is 
distinguishable from Mr. Hulse's case. Alternatively, J\1owrey was decided in error. 
Simply writing "denied" on the face of a motion without any explanation or 
acknowledgment of exercised discretion effectively insulates a district court's decision from 
appellate review. Should trial courts be permitted to adopt this practice, it effectively deprives 
appellate courts of their ability to review their judgments. Moreover, as long as trial court's are 
permitted to insulate their rulings from appellate review, criminal defendants will be deprived of 
important appellate rights. 
As was the case here, without a hearing Mr. Hulse was unable to request an explanation 
of the district court's decision. In such circumstances trial courts must be required to at a 
minimum provide enough explanation or analysis establishing that it recognized the issue as one 
of discretion and that it reached its conclusion by an exercise of reason. It would be unjust to 
hold that criminal defendant bear the burden of providing the appellate court with the district 
court's rationale for review when there is no means for a defendant to obtain it. A criminal 
defendant cannot be held responsible for an inadequate appellate record when the trial court's 
actions preclude him from providing one. 
Finally, the district court also abused its discretion by unduly limiting the information it 
would consider before ruling upon Mr. Hulse's Rule 35 motion. As explained in Mr. Hulse's 
Opening Brief, when \ifr. Hulse filed his Rule 35 motion he also requested leave "in order to 
further supplement the motion with supporting documentation and/or other evidence." CR. 53. 
'fhis request was likely made because Mr. Hulse's counsel understood that he would be required 
to provide new or additional information in support of his request for leniency. See State v. 
Huffinan, 144 Idaho 201,203, 159 P.3d 838,840 (2007). 1\evertheless the district court denied 
his request ft1r more time to supplement the record without explanation. 
The State argues Mr. Hulse should have made an offer of proof as to what evidence he 
wished to present in support of his Rule 35 motion. Respondent's Brief, pp. 3-4. Though Mr. 
Hulse did not provide an offer of proof providing the district court with the substance of what 
new or additional information he intended to support his Rule motion with, Mr. Hulse 
nonetheless put the district court on notice that he did in fact intend to provide new or additional 
information. Thus, when the district court denied Mr. Hulse's request for leave to further 
supplement his motion, the denial was an impermissible limitation on the information it would 
consider in deciding the motion. See State v. Torres, 107 Idaho 895, 898 693 P.2d 1097, 1100 
(Ct. App. 1984). 
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lll. CONCLUSION 
For all the reasons set forth above and in Mr. Hulse's Opening Brief, this Court should 
reverse the district court's order denying Mr. Hulse's Rule 35 motion and remand the matter 
allowing the district court to properly exercise its sound discretion in determining whether 
leniency is warranted in this case. 
Respectfr1lly submitted this J.l__ day of February, 2012. 
- -
Attorney for Stacey Hulse 
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